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In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
ROY FREE.
Plaintiff and Respondent,
YS.

SWEN C. JENSEN, CHRIS JENSEN,
AND ALMA JENSEN, His Wife, AND

REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL
CREDIT CORPORATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, a Corporation,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal From District Court of the Second Judicial
Di~trid, in and For Davis County,
State of Utah.
Honorable Lester A. 'Vade, Judge

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
'rhe appellants, Swen C. Jensen, Chris Jensen and
Alma Jensen and Regional Agricultural Credit
Corporation claim, in their brief, that plaintiff
herein acquired no title by his deed from Davis
County to the land in question. They contend first,
that the auditor's tax deed is void hecause it was
hased upon a tax sale for delinquent taxes for the
yenr 1933 which defendantc; claim were paid, and
wa~. in legal effect, a r~edemption, and, second, that
tl1R title plnintiff holds, if any. WRR acquired as the
HQ'Pnt of or in trnst for defenchmt Alice Farnworth.
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1.
Several pages of appellants' brief are devoted to
the proposition that tue tax deed in question is void
because of mis-description of this land in certain of
the tax pr9ceeding1s. The only evidence before the
Court, relative to these tax proceedlngs, is plaintiff's Exhibit A which is a published notice o[ the
May sale, plaintiff's ~xhibit B which is the certificate of sale, plaintiff's ~xhibit U which is the
auditor's tax deed and plaintiff's Exhibit E which
is the check of J. R. Free to Davis County in the
sun1 of $656.30, the latter representing the purchase
price of the tax title; and also a reference by defendants to the 1935 assessment roll of Davis
County, page 58, line 34, which shows the description last above mentioned of the land in question.
We shall first call the Court's attention to Section 80-10-35 of the Revised Statutes, which provides this form to be used for tax sale certificates,
and concludes :
''The certificate of sale ~igned by the
county treasurer is prima facie evidence of
the regularity of all proceedings connectetl
with the assessment, notice. equalization,
levies, advertisement and sale of the property therein described, and the burden of
showing any irregularity in any of the proCPedings rPsulting in the sale of property
for the nonpayment of' delinquent taxes
shall he on him who asserts it."
The certificate of sale here de1scribed the land in
question as follows:
Beg. NE cor. of Sec. 34, Twp. 2 N. Rg. 1 W,
S. L. :M., R. 22-517 rds; Vl to .Jord1n River;
N a long E bank to N line of SeC'. iJ3, E to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
beg. cont. 80 A. Also beg. 22-517 rds. S
fr. NE oor. of above Sec. S 52-1/3 rds. \\.. to ·
Jordan River; N along E bank of river to
a pt. 22-5/7 rds. S fr. N line of Sec 33 E to
beg. cont. 183 A.
Counsel argue that the ''above section'' in the second part of the description means Section 33. The
first description refers to the Northeast corner and
so does the second description, the first starting at
the Northeast corner and the other 22.5 rods south
of the Northeast corner. The meaning of the description can, we think, be readily ascertained, without conjecture, from the description itself and without resort to extraneous evidence; and it meets the
test stated in
Tintic Undine ~fining Company v. Ercanbrack, 93 Ut. 561; 74 P. (2d) 11S41
as follows:
''The description must be definite enough
for the lien to attach to the property without extraneous evidence. ''
The delinquent list was not introduced in evidence,
and for that.reason it must be presumed that the description in the certificate of sale was taken from
the delinquent list and harmonizes with it. The
delinquent list f.or the year 1933 has disappeared,
and cannot be found in the proper records of Davis
County, and we are entitled to presume that in its
description of the land in question, it was the same
as in the certificate of sale; and seeo111dary evidence
of the list was not offered. But even if the description in the published list were as set out in the
answer of thfl' defendants Jensen (Ab. 15), it was
sufficient under this Court's interpretation of
Rev. Sts. Utah, 1933, 80-11-6. wl1ich reads
a~ foHow:;;:
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''In the assessment of land or the advertisement and sale thereof for taxes, initial
letters, abbreviations and figures may be
used to designate the township, range, section, or parts of sections." (And see Burton v. Hoover, 93 Ut. 498, 74 P. (2d) 652).
_o\s to the contention that the property had been
1mproperly assess.ed, let us go directly to the assessment for the year 1933. Counsel admit that the
property then stood in the name of James Farnworth. It is that year that respondent's tax title
is based; and it is for that year's taxes that the
property was sold.
Section 80-10-40 provides as follows:
''In case property assessed for taxes i~
sold to the County, it must be ass·essed in
subsequent year~ for taxes in the same
manner as if it had not been sold. While
the certificate of sale is held by the County, the treasurer shall not sell for taxes
the property covered by sneh certificate,
but the sale under any such assessment
muRt be postponed until the time for redemption under the previous sale shall
have expired.''
'fhat provision of the statute has been strictly followed by the ass.essor of Davis County, and the
taxes against this property for the years subsequent to 1933 have been assessed in the same manner as if the property had not been sold. So there
h-: absolutely no merit whatever to the question
whether or not Farnworth later disposed of some
or all of his interest in the property. There is no
question raised at all about the y·alidity of the
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assessment for the year 1933. Further1nore, Section 80-10-38 provides as follows:
''Whenever property is sold for the nonpayment of delinquent taxes, and the
assessment is valid in part and void as to
excess, the sale must not for that cause be
deemed invalid, nor shall any grant subsequently n1ade thereunder be held insufficient to pass a title to the grantee, unless
the owner of th(.l! property or his agent, not
less than six days before the time at which
the property is advertised to be sold, delivers to the treasurer a protest in writing
signed by the owner or agent, specifying the
portion of the tax which he claims to be
invalid, and the wound upon which . such
claim is based. ''
There is no evidence before the court that the owner
or anyone interested in this property ever made
any protest to the treasurer specifying that any
portion of the taxes assessed against this land was
invalid. The contention of eounsel beginning with
the last paragraph on page 10 of their brief, that
the 1933 taxes were actually paid is insupportable
in view of
Reetion 80-10-59, Revised Statutes of Utah,
1933, as Amended by the Session Laws
of Utah, 1935,
which provides the manner of redemption for real
estate taken over by the County for delinquent
taxes. That ~ection specifically provides that rerlemption certificate cannot issue fr01n a tax sale
until ''all of the taxes subsequently assessed and
all interest, penaltie~ :=1nd costs'' that have acrrued
thereon are paid. That same ~wction provirlPs,
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however, that any person wishing to make payntents toward redemption may do so in any sum in
excess of $10.00 and then provides further how the
treasurer may apply such partial payments and
how the same shall be distributed, as fol1ows:
''First, against the interest accrued upon
the delinquent tax for the last year included in said delinquent account at the time
of payment;
'' Second, againHt the penalty charged upon
the delinquent tax for the last year included
in the delinquent account at the time of
payment;
''Third, against the delinquent tax for the
laRt year included in the delinquent account
at the time of payment;
''Fourth, against the interest accrued upon the delinquent tax for the next to last
year ineluded in the delinquent account at
the time of payment;
''And so on until ther full amount of the delinquent tax, penalty and interest upon the
unpaid balances shall have been paid within the period of redemption as aforesaid.
(L. '33, Ch. 61, Sec. 1, amending Rev. St.
'B3, Sec. 80-10-59)."
In the case before the Court the treasurer \did exactly as the last mentioned section of the statute
requireB that he mm~t do. 'Vhen Farnworth paid
the s·aid sum of $164.43 the treasurer applied it to
the taxes £or the last year, which was the year 1937,
with its penalty, interest and ~costs, and then
applied the balance on the 1936 taxes.
The section last cited also provides that anyone
whosP property has been sold for taxes, and for
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7
which the four year period allowed for redemption has not expired, may have the redemption period extended for an additional
year by paying an runount equal to that part
of the delinquent tax which is four years delinquent, plus penalty, plus accrued interest on such
delinquent tax1 which accounts for ~1r. · Farnworth
paying the exact amount of the taxe,s £or 1933 plus
penalty, interest and costs, so precisely s.et out by
counsel on page 11 of their brief.
In answer to that we merely refer again to
Section 80-10-59, Session Laws of Utah,
1933, and to
Section 80-10-61 as Amended by Session
Laws of Utah, 1935.
These statutes simply make it impossible to pay
the taxes for the year upon which the sale is hased
without paying all subsequent taxes because only
une certificate of sale can he issued for a piece of
real estate so long as any delinquent taxes remain
unpaid, or unsettled, by the Board of County Commissioners or the State Tax Commission and there
ran be no redemption until ran delinquent taxes
have been settled.
The issues presented by this appeal were all carefully analyzed and discussed by the trial judge in
a very full and complete opinion which appears as
a part of the files of this appeal, and the appellant
adopts this opinion and the reasoning and citations
therein as sustaining his position on this apPeal
and respectfully refers this Court to a careful con~ideration of the said opinion without repeating or
setting it forth in detail in this brief.
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II.
The appellants enunwrate the jurisdictional requirements of the valid '. May sale as follows: (a) a
proper notice of the time and place of sale published in a newspaper having general circulation in the
county; (b) that less than the entire tract was
offered for the amount of the taxes properly assess. .
ed; (c) that no sufficient bid was made for less than
the whole· of the property; and (d) that the p:rbperty was sold for the amount of taxes properly
ass·essed. (Appellants' brief, p. 18). As to the
first requirement appellants say, ''although a
notice was put into evidence there was no proof
that it was published in a newspaper having general
c~irculation in the county or that it was posted in
five public places. The Revised Statutes, Section
t>2-1-1 tells us what a newspaper of general circulation is and Section 104-50-2 provides:
''Evidence of the publication of a document or notice required by law or an orJer
of a court or jndge to be pu hlished iu the
n~wspaper may he given l1~· the affi<lavit of
the printer of the ncw~paper O·l' his foreman or principal clerk annexed to a copy
of the document or notice providing the
dateR when a~d the paper in "·hich the puh11rntion was made.''
In this case the affidavit annexed to a copy of the
notice was filed but the point made hy appellants
is whether the affidavit is prima facie evidence that
the newspaper, The Weekly Reflex, was a newspaper of g1eneral circulation in Davis County. We
are not aware of any Utah decision on the precise
quegtion. In analogous matters it has . been held
that the affidavit should show that the newspaper
is one of the character in which the statute authorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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izes publication to be n1ade (2 Bancroft Code Pr.
and Rem. 1373, Sec. 949.) ; and ''unless otherwise
provided by statute, the affidavit need not contain
the numerous details as to the character of the newspaper; and in the absence of sufficient evidence to
the contrary a publisher's affidavit reciting that.
the newspaper iB properly qualified is sufficient to
establish the fact that the newspaper is a legal
newspaper.''
7 Bancroft Code Pr. and Rem. 77:39, Sec.
5851.
In 61 C. J. 1182, Sec. 1595, it is said:
~'The

prescribed 1nethod of proof is usual-

ly an affidavit made and recorded by an

officer or the printer in whose paper the
advertisement was published with a copy
of the advertisement or newspaper annexed
thereto," - citing Rafferty v. Davis, 54
Or. 77, 102 P. 305; Herr v. Graden, 59
Colo. 372, 148 P. 863..
The second requirement specified by the appellants
is "that less than the entire tract was first offered
for the amount of the taxes properly assessed.''
The Revised Statutes_ of Utah, '33, 80-10..:68 as
amended by the laws of Utah, 1933, Chapter. 62,
Section 1 provided that at the May sale of property
the county commissioners should offer for sale ''to
the hi_qhest bidder" each parcel of real est.ate
which had been conveyed to the county during the
current year, and provided that
"the fir~t bid received in an amount suffiric>nt to pay th<> taxP~. penalties, interest
and cm:ts, inclnding all taxes assessed suhRermently to the date of the certificate of
Rale shall b{lo accepted, unless a further
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bid in an anwunt sufficient to pay said
taxes, penaltiest interest and costs for less
than the entire parcel shall be received and
the highest bid shall be construed to mean
the bid of that party who will pay in cash
the full amount of the taxes, penalties, interest and costs for the smallest portion of
the entire parcel."
It will be observed that the statute does not requirQ
that less than the entire parcel should be first offered nor does that or any other statute provide that a
record shall be made of the method of sale adopted
at the auction. It is not required that an explanation of the method of sale shall be contained in the
notice of sale, nor that it shall be explained by the
.crier at the auction. The tax deed td the plaintiff
recites that the property had been duly advertised
and sold to the "highest bidder" which, according
to the statute, is the purchaser even if he only paid
an amount sufficient to pay the taxes, etc., for the
entire parcel. If any method of procedure is in·
· dieated in the statute it is that the auctioneer
should first ask for bids for the entire parcel and
then ask for further bids for less than the entire
parcel. Se·e
LeCompte v. Smith, 82 Kan. 543; 108 P.
R10

Tieman v ..Johns.on, 114 La. 112; 38 So. 7!).
~ everthel~ss.

whether the bid of the person who
offers to pay the taxes for the entire parcel or the
bid of the person who offers to pRy the taxes for
~eR~ tl1an the entire parf'Pl is Rccept.ed, that person
becomes the "highest. bidder." The appellants do
not pre~ent any authorities althoug·h in almost
every State they ·havP. or have had simibl· statutes.
See
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61 C. J. 1195, 1196, 1209, 1348, Sees. 1610,
1612, 1632, 1900, and Notes.
\V e have no statute as in some jurisdiction~ under
a kindred procedure that if there a1e no bids to
pay the taxes, etc., for less than the entire parcel
and this must appear of record.
61 C. J. 1195, Section 1611.

In 61 C J. 1209, Sec. 1632 it is said:
''Under a statutory requirement that the
sale must be to the highest bidder the record
must show that the party who purchased
was the highest bidder." But "under a
statute which provides that the land shall
be sold to the ·highest bidder a sale of the
entire tract is valid although a sale of a
proportion of the tract would have been
sufficient to pay the taxes due·.''
61 C. J. 1195, Sec. 1610, cites
:Merchants Trust Co. v. Wright, 161 Cal.
149; 118 P. 517.
In 61 C. J. 1196, Sec. 1612, Note 49 (a) it
is said:
"Sold to the hig1hest bidder. A deed which
recites that the land was sold to the highest bidder· is void.
Carpenter v. Gann, 51 Cal. 193.''
That cannot be true under our statute, according to which the purchaser on either of the alternative terms~ is the highest bidder. Of course a
deed which shows that the sale was conducted con. trary to the statute may he void on its face.
Wall v. Kaighn, 45 Utah 244; 144 P. 1100.
61 f1. J. 1345, Rec. 1896.
Finally in
fl1 ( 1• .T. 1209, R~e. 1.6:32, Not~ 50, it iR said:
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''Evidence of highest bidder - where the
record of the sale showed that by its terms
the highest bidder should be the purchaser
and that a certain person was the purchaser it was evidence that such person
was the highest bidder," - citing Smith v.
Messer, 17 N. H. 420.
The appellants say: ''In this case the property conFisted of several acres divided into two parcels
each separately described. The county commissioners were therefore required to first offer the parcels separately. The italicized statement depends
on the point of view, consequently we deny it.''
In 61 C. J. 1197, Sec. 1614, it is said:
'''A valid sale may be made of s,everal contiguous tracts or parcels, which are assessed as a whole. and the tax cannot be arbitrarily apportioned, that is, a part of a
tract, assessed as a whoJe, cannot be sold
for a portion of the tax, and such an apportioniUent has been held in some jurisdictions void, and elsewhere voidable, unless
there is legal cause for staying· as to a
part.''
The third jurisdictional requirement of a valid May
sale specified by the appellants is, '' (c) that no
sufficient bid was made for le~ss than the whole of
the property.'' We are not so sure that we understand this objection, but perhaps the following quotation from
·
61 C. J. 1191, Sec. 1605, constitutes an
answer:
''It is always the intention that land offered at tax sale shall bring not less than the ·
whole amount of the taxes due on it, with
lawful costs and charges~ and in some
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~tate~

this i~ expres~ly required by statute, so that a ~ale for a les~ runount is in·
valid. But this condition being fulfilled,
the mere inadeqztacy of the price p.aid considered 1-Cith reference to the true or market val,ue of the land is no v.alid objection
to the sale, but gross inadequacy, of price
may justify the courts in laying stress on
other matters constituting in themselve~
only irregularities and so finding grounc~
to set the- sale aside. ''
The fourth jurisdictional requirement of a valid
'May sale specified by appellant~ is, ''that the property was sold for the amount of the taxes properly
assessed.'' Regarding this objection, appellants
~ay: ''Not only is there an absence of proof of a
valid sale, there is affirmative proof of a void sale.
ThP amount of the taxes for the year 1933, including interest and penalties for which the property was
sold to Davis County was the sum of $127.40. The
property was sold to the plaintiff for the sum of
$643.40. The difference between the two sums
apparently represents the amount of taxes assessed
subsequent to the year 1933 although there was no
{•vidence showing the amount of those assessments.
It was established that the assessment of taxes subsequent to the year 1933 was invalid.'' The basi~
of this objection 1~ the following statement in 61
C. J. 1192, Sec. 1606: "If real property is sold at
tax sale for an amount exceeding the aggregate of
taxes~ costs, penalties, and charges for which thPland is legally and actually liable, in a number of
jurisdictions the sale is entirely void and passe~ no
title,'' - citing Asper v. ~1:oon, 23 Utah 241; 67 P.
409. A similar- pro.pcsition is s;tated in ~1:ammoth
ritv v. Snow, 69 Utah 204: 253 P. 680,. as follows:
"Where there is no sufficient df'Rcript.ion of nropPrt~T aRReR~ed to iit0ntify it. with rf\asonable rPrtainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ty, taxpa.ye-r may enjoin collection of tax or if property is sold for non-payment of tax he may treat
sale as nullity and have it set aside or certificate or
deed based thereon canceled.''
The tax sale here is not one that the appellants may
t~eat as a nullity for the reasons urged by thPm.
Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 87, 8ec. 1.
61 C. J. 1335, Sec. 1872, Note 11 (a).
This Court has recently held, that
''where a description in tax sale proceedings is too vague or too indefinite to
notify the owner that it is his property that
is being taxed and insufficient to inform
prospective purchasers as to what property is to he sold, the resulting tax title
after sale is void.''
Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 412; 85 P. (2d)
827.
And in Mammoth City v. Snow, supra, this Court
held that paym,ent of taxes by the owner under an
assessment insufficiently describing the propertv
was good; citing Shackleford v. McGlasken, 27
N. M. 456; 202 P. 690; 23 A. L. R. 75. See also 61
C.•T. 1398, Sec. 1982, note.
In this case the owner, Alice Farnworth, paid the
taxes for 1937 and part of them for 1936. The description of property in the assessment roll need
not be more definite than in a tax deed, and a.R to
the latter, it has been said {61 C. J. 1353, Sec. 1914),
that ''in the absence of statutoTy requirement the
deed need not follow the form appearing in the tax
list, it being sufficient if the land be definitely
identified even thoug-h this he in different language
or abbreviations from the tax list;'' and, ''further,'' if the description {in the tax deed) is such
that it furnishes means hy which the land may be
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identified with reasonable certainty, that is all that
the law required. It is not necessary that the deed
should of itself describe lands so that they may be
located by the deed alone, but it is sufficient if the
description contained in such deed furnishes the
means by which the lands may be identified. The
description may be incomplete or inaccurate, and
yet to make the deed valid, if it leaves no doubt
about the identity of the property, and where the
deed is definite and certain enough to enable thoEe
familiar with it readily to recognize the land intended to be sold, a. technical inaccuracy or clerical
error will not invalidate it.

III.

IX THE THIRD DiviSION OF THEIR BRIEF
APPELLANTS ARGUE THAT THE
COUNTY AUDITOR WAS WITHOUrl~
POWER TO EXECUTE A DEED TO A
PURCHASER AT THE MAY SALE- IT
IS RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT
THE DEED GIVEN WAS MERELY VOIDABLE AND AMENDABLE BY GIVING A
NEW DEED - BUT IF NOT, THAT NO
DEED WAS iNECESSARY; AND, FURTHER, THAT APPELLANTS ARE NOT IN
A POSrTION TO OBJECT TO THE AUDITOR'S DEED.

'

The discovery that the Davis County deed to the
paintiff was executed by the wrong official was
apparently made while appellants were preparing
their hrief filed here. At the trial, they only made
the general objection to the introduction of the deed
in evidence that it was irrelevant and incompetent.
They did not mention the objection and rJJling in
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the abstract of record; nor is it the subject of an
assignment of error. The appellants .Jensen, in
their answer, pointed out specifically a.U the defects which they supposed invalidated the plain·
Hff 's title. The respondent contends, therefore,
that those appellants are not now in a position to
contend that the deed was invalid. rrhey contend
that if the first deed were insufficient, they were
~entitled to a new deed.
1.

There are many Court decisions holding that the ex·
ecution and delivery of a tax title is necessary to
vest title in the purchaser at a tax sale; but this
Court will find that such decisions are based on the
statutes of the particular States. rrhe Supreme
Court of Iowa has held that ''under statutes providing that no title to land sold for taxes vests in
grantee unless a tax deed has been executed,
acknowledged, and recorded, until no adverse in·
terest is divested;'' and that "a tax deed furnishes
the taxpayer the official evidenee of his title and
authorizes him to enter upon the possession and enjoyment of the estate.'' The pertinent Iowa statutes were cited. In
Spaulding v. E,Ilsworth, 39 Fla. 76; 21 So.
812.
it was held that "a purchaser at a tax sale had not
even a prima facie right to the land purchased by
J1im or its po~session until the execution and delivery of a deed therefor;'' and the Court said that
the deed is the final consummation of the sale referred to in this section, means the completed sale,
accomplished hv the exe1r.ntion and deliverv of the
deed. . The opinion shows t.hat the neeessity of a
deed was dedueed from various statutes of that.
State. The decision in Burgin v. Rutherford, 511
N. J. ECl. 666; 38 A. 854, is to the sam(l effect. And
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in 61 C. J. 1331, Sec. 1864, it is 8aid: "Under some
statutes, it is the rule that the purchaser at a tax
sale, by his performance of all that is necessary to
entitle him to a deed, becomes invested with title at
the expiration of the period of redemption, although
the deed has not yet issued to him,'' (citing Youngs
v. Povey, 127 Mich. 297, 86 N. W. 809; Beggs v.
Paine, 15 N. D. 436, 109 N. W. 322); however it
seems to be more generally held that the execution
and delivery of a tax deed is necessary to vest title
in the purchaser." And see
61 C. J. 1360, 1395, Sees. 1928, 1975.

In other States we find an opposite rule, also based
on their statutes. In
Cooper v. Board of Commissioners, (Old.),
105 P. (2d) 1052, the Court held·
''Not every statutory provision regarding
issuance of tax deed is mandatory;'' and
''where all official acts leading up to the
sale of property for delinquent taxes down
to and including a resale of such property,
had been regularly performed and the purchaser had done all that the law required
him to do in order to entitle· him to a deed,
purchaser's right to deed was· not lost by
failure, neglect or refusal of county treas.urer to execute, acknowledge and deliver
such dfled within the statutory time."
In McCague Inv. Co v. Mallin, 23 Wyo.
201; 147 P. 507, the Court said, that
''where the time for redemption has expired, and the purchaser had paid the price
and was entitled to a deed~ failure of thP.
county treasurer to execute and deliver
deed, or of the county commissioners to
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cause it to be executed and delivered, did
not invalidate the sale by the county.>'
In Cavender v. Phillips, 41 N. M. 235; 67
P. (2d) 257,
the dissenting judge referred to New Mexico cases
of the same kind. He said:
"We stated in Witt v. Evans., 36 N. M. 365;
16 P. (2d) 60, 61: 'Under the statute in
question the deed is of slight importance.
The sale itself, applicable from recordation
of the certificate divests the owner of legal
title. Section 442. The right to redeem
from the tax here in question lapsed not
later than January 27, 1926. (New 1\Iexico~ cases).
On that date the county had
'complete legal title,' which on :March 28,
1927, it passed to the appellant by assignment of the certificate. Evidently the
office of the deed was not to pass a legal
title which the .grantees already had or to
divest the original owner of a title which
he had already lost. It was preserved in
the s1ystem as a conventional muniment of
title, as prima facie evidence of certain
facts, and (originally) but not ·after reneal of Section 458 (Laws 1925, c. 102, SeCtion 28) to prevent reversion of title to the
ori!rinal owner on failure to demand title
within the 6 years'.''
Under the Utah statute the further rights of. the
owner, as, for example, a statutory right to redeem, or, by action, to ·OOntest the tax title, never
has depended on the execution of the tax deed. nor
the rights of the owners, such as his right of possession, never have depended on the execution and
oe1iver? of the deerl. The Revised Statutes of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,..
19

,_

Utah l~J3, 80-10-6b, providL,d, that, "'Ihe clerk is
authorized to execute deeds the ref or (the property)
in the name of the county,'' and as amended by
laws of Utah, 1933, Chapter 62, Section 1, the statute in force at the time of the sale in this case, Section 80-10-68 provided, "the county clerk is authorized to execute deeds for all property sold pursuant
to this section in the name of the county and attest
the same by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of
the title of the State (and others:) in the real estate
so sold." The same section provided, that "the
board of county commissioners shall, at any time
after the period of redemption q,nd before the sale
as herein provided, permit the redemption of such
property." And see, Telonis v. Staley, (Utah), 106
P. (2d) 163. The decision in Richardson v. State
Tax Com., 92 Utah 503; 69 P. (2d) 515. is not
opposed to this contention.
The general rule is, th~at the power vested in an
official to execute a tax deed is not exhausted until
a de-ed is made in compliance with the law. 61 C. J.
1333, 1360, Sees. 1870, 1928. If a specific objeCJtion
to the admissibility of the plaintiff's tax deed had
been made he could easily have obtained a new deed,
and obviated the objection. In Sheafer v. Mitchell,
109 Tenn. 181; 71 S. W. 86, it was said: Objections
made to the reading of evide11ce and exhibits in the
court below must be clear and specific, that the
party may have the opportunity to cure the defect
and not be taken by surprise when that opportunity
may not be had." This is a well recogttlized r:ule,
and the principle of it has widespread application.
There is a further objection, which applies only to
the appellants Jensen. They, in· their answer, perhans unnPcN;;~arily. pointPrl out a~ we have already
stated, what they conceived were all the defect~ in
the proceedings; and now, they are precluded from
11rging other d(\fPC't~..
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In 49 C. J. 288, Sec. 352, it is said, that "whatever
is admitted in a special defense operates so far as
& modification of a general denial.'' The same rule
applies to all pleadings.. In a suit to quiet' title, the
plaintiff may ·alleg1e his title and possession, or
right of possession, in general terms.; hut if, after
~Jleging title in general terms, he. attempts to set
:out facts or sources or title by specific averments,
the latter ordinarily c10ntrol. State v. Rolio, -71
Utah 91; 262 P. 9.87. And if a plaintiff files a reply, whether necessary or not, he must reply to the.
whole answer or counterclaim, and his denials must
reach everythng he intends to deny. Cain v.
Stewart, 47 JJtah ·160; 152 P. 465.

IV.
THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY PROPOSITION IV OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF WA~
NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL CODRT';
AND THEREJ ARE NO ASSIGNMENTS OF
ERROR PRESENTING THE POINT MADE
BY IT EXCEPTING THE CONTRADICTORY ONES CONTAINED IN THE 16TH
ASSIGN~fENT OF ERROR, VIZ (1) THAT
TliE PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY HIM
AS HELD IN TRUST FOR DEFENDANT,
ALICE FARNWORTH AND (2) TO AID
AND ARSIRT HER TO DEFRAUD APPEL-

"r

LANTS.

(Ab. 94).

The points argued under the foregoing proposition
suggest a total departur.e from the case tried in
the court below. As we have heretofore shown,
the appellant, Regional A~gricultur8J Credit Corporation alleged in its answer that any title vested
in the plaintiff or claimed or asserted by him in or
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to said property is held hy hiin in trust for the defendant, Alice Farnworth; and that the· appellants
Jensen alleged in their answers that James Farnworth and Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen procured the plaintiff to purchase said property from
Davis County for and on their behalf and that
the plaintiff acted merely as the agent of the Farnworths and Skeen in the purchase of said property.
And that said Farnworths or Skeen furnished the
money to the plaintiff to purchase said purported
tax title and by reason thereof they allege that the
actual purchasers of said tax title were said Farnworths or said Skeen.
There was not a suggestion of a conspiracy to defraud in the answers nor was there any evidence of
fraud except an attempt by appellants by the .testimony of the plaintiff to show what the constructive fraud, which is incidental to the establishment
of constructive trusts was. The above were the
simple allegations· of the answers upon the issues
made upon which the case was tried; but now appellants, in their brief filed here, say: "It is impossible to read the evidence even in the most casual
manner without being at once convinced that the
purchase of this property by the plaintiff was the
final act of a conspiracy to deprive the appellants
of their interest therein. The participants in the
scheme were the oefendant Alice Farnworth, her
attorney, D. A. Skeen. and the plaintiff." (Appel·
lants' brief, pp. 31-32).

•I

The appellants Jensen attempted to ple~ad a resulting trust (65 C. J. 1040, Section 97) and although
the allegation of the Recional Ag-ricultural Credit
Corpo·ration that the plaintiff held the property
in trust for the defendant Alice Farnworth was
purely a conclm'!ion of law (Sav. & Loan Socjptv v.
Davidson,
F. 696),
mnRt
aRsume
that
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tempted to plead either a resulting or constructive
trust.
Rubin v. Midlinsky, 321 Ill. 436; 152 N. E.
219.
Alexander v. Spaulding, 160 Ind. 176; 66
N. E. 219.
The evidence does not show, nor do the appellants_
now cl!aim, that Alice Farnworth advanced money
to the plaintiff with which to purchase the tax title
and the question of a resulting trust _may he eliminated; and we shall argue the case on the theory
that all the appellants by their pleadings claim is
that plaintiff held the property as the constructive
trustees of Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen.
The law, as we understand it, is: that strangers such
as the r appellants cannot sue the alleged promisor,
in this case the plaintiff, to establish or enforce a
·constructive trust in favor of the promisee, in this
case Alice Farnworth or D ..A. Skeen;
-Powell v. International Harvester Oo., 41
N.D. 220; 170 N. W. 559.
Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351; 119
S. \Y. 75-82; 23 :L. R. A. (N. S.) 659,
665.
Brace v. V anEps, 12 S. E. 191; 80 N. \V.
197, 199.
In re Reynolds Estate (Neh.L 268 N. W.
480;
but we shall~ as briefly as possible, refer to the
Jaw on the question of such trusts to show that the
appellants did not try this case in the District Court
on the theo'ry that the plaintiff and respondents
Farnworth and Skeen had conspired to defraud the
appellants of their rights in the property.
Jt is held that a constructive trust arises from fraud,
artnal or constructive, and that such a trust arises
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not primarily from the parol agreement to acquire
and hold property from the principal, but from
fraud and undue influence connected therewith.
\Vestphal v. Heckman, 185 Ind. 88; 113
N. E. 299.

And what is called ''constructive fraud'' is shown
in such cases as
Harras v. Harras, 68 Wash. 258; 110 P.
1085.
Bryan v. Douds, 213 P. State 221; 62 A.
929; 110 Am. St. Reports 554.
Brood & Erie Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Barnhard, 12 Pa. Supra 345 ; 180 A.
386.

It consists in such facts as these: That by reason
of the agreement of the promisor to purchase for
another, the latter was lulled into inactivity and
was prevented from protecting his riglhts in the
land or refrained from doing so and the promisor
was enabled to secure the land at a price materially
below its actual value.

There is a great difference between an action to
an active trust which embraces only technical fraud and one that is based upon fraud as the
substantive cause of action as for instance a con.spiracy to defraud .the plaintiff of his rights. AB
was said in
TJnkel v. Robinson, 163 Cal. 648; 126 P.
485:
''True, the appellant is ~eeking- to establish
a constructive tru~t hut such a trust may
ariRe nnder various circnm~tances which
may embrare no element of fraud or even
technical fraud within the law. Here the
rom:;t.ructive trm~t which appellant ene~tablish
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deavors to have established is based on
fraud a.s a substantive cause of action.''
lt has been held that a mortg·agee of land cannot
have a tax title annulled be0ause of fraud between
the owner of the land and the tax purchaser where
:such fraud is not alleged in the complaint.
Federal Land Bank v. Hili, 170 La. 118;
129 So. 654.
61 C. J. 1440, Section 2047.
But whether that is generally true or not, the appellants could not establish a constructive trus.t against
Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen or hold them for
a conspiracy to defraud appellants of their rights,
unless they were parties to the action or issue.
Holian v. Holian, 265 Mass. 563; 164 N. E.
475.
Meldrim v. Doyle, 12'4 Cal. App. 514; 12 P.
(2d) 997.
Neil v. Wideman, 59 Ark. 5; 26 S. \V. 5.
And that would have required a cross complaint,
which in this case was not filed. In the appellants'
. brief we find the statement that ''the defendants
.Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen conveniently defaulted although the latter did set up a mortgage
in his favor given by his co-defendant.'' 1\1r. SkN~n
filed an an_swer setting up his mortgage and he participated in the trial so it if;; difficult to see how
he "def•aulted" unless it is the notion of appellants'
counsel that he should have made an i~sue of some·
thing alleged in their answe·r, which he or Mrs.
F'arnworth was not called upon to do.
rrhe testimony does not shO'V a constructiYe trust,
nor fraud of any kind. The statements of Mr. Free
that he would protect Mrs. Farn\\~orth were too
vague to found a constructive tru~t upon.
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Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham C'Vyo.),
109 P. (2d) ±63.

And see
Brown v.

~Iurray, 94 N. J. Equity 125 ;.118
A. 53-!.
~Iiller Y. Kyle, 107 Kans. 368; 191 P. 492.

In the Wyoming case involving a receiver's sale,
the court said the receiver had a right to sell his
interest to anyone he pleased, with the consent of
the court, and the defendant had the right to buy it,
and added ''there was no fraud in that.'' The same
can be said here of the plaintiff. The cases holding
that one who is acting as an agent in the purchase
and who takes the title in his own name is regarded
as having purchased for his principal and will be
held as trustee, are not in point here. Such cases
suppose an employment, such as in the case of reaJ
estate brokers
Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805; 113 So. 419; ·
54 A. L. R. 1172.
Johnson v. Hayward, 74 Neb. 157; 103
X. "\V. 1058; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112.

Harrop v. Cole, 85 K. J. Equ. 22; 95 A. 378.
Jackson v. Pleasonton, 95 Va. 654; 29 S. E.
680;

and so it is said that an agent cannot acquire title
at a sale of land for taxes, as whatever interest he
does acquire will be held by him in trust for his
principal.
.
Peabody v. Burri, 255 Ill. 592; 99 N. E. 378.
We find the word ''agent'' often misused by the
pleader in this class of cases, but whatever its
meaning, there was no such employment or agency
in thiR case.
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In 61 C. J., Section 1996, it is said that:
''Generally speaking, fraud in the procurement of
a tax deed is ground for its cancellation in equity
whether the fraud is actual or constructive,''
.citing, among other cases, Guldner v. Guldner, 199
]owa 986; 203 N. W. 289, cited by appellants here.in. The ·only right the appellants had in the property here in question at the time of the transaction
here complained of, if any, was the right of redemption and if we ignore their claims of trust,
all they could ask even if the plaintiff and certain
:of the defendants had conspired to defraud them
by causing them to lose the right of redemption
(which, obviously, they never had the thought of exercising), was to be allowed to redeem.
Widersum v. 'Bender, 172 :Mass., p. 36; 52
N. E. 717.
However, in this case, each .of the appellants in
their pleadings asserted the trust on behalf of the
defendants Farnworth and Skeen agains.t the plaintiff as trustee on the theory the title had vested in
him. In that case the tax deed forms a part of the
'pl,aintiff's title and in granting relief the court
could not set aside or cancel the deed as was done
in the cas.es cited in appellants' brief.
Luscombe v. Grigsby, 11 S. D. 408: 78 N. W.
357.

This case was briefed to the Court. and in the brief
furnished by the respondent, we said:
The defendant, Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation, pleads aR a defense. ''That any title which
mav be ves.ted in the plaintiff or claimed or asserted
by .him in or to said property above mentioned is
held by him in trust f.o,r the defendant, Alice Farnworth, and said. plaintiff has no estate, right, title,
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claim 01 mterest in or to said property. of any kind
or character prior or superior to the lien of this defendant's judgment and decree as aforesaid,'' and
further, that the defendant, Alice Farnworth, ''is
now the owner in fee simple of said property subjected to the lien of this defendant's judgment and
decree" set forth in the answer.
The purport of this defense, (and it is only such)
would therefore seem to be, that while Alice Farnworth is the owner of the legal title, and probably
that defendants ,Jensen are the owners of the equitable title, both of these titles are subject to an equity
in favor of the Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation. Many actions to quiet title, and perhaps
of ejectment, have reached the Supreme Court of
this State in which the defendant alleged or claimed
that the plaintiff held the legal title as a constructive trustee for him. Preliminarily, we shall mention the following cases of that character:
Kahn Y. Old Telegraph ~lin. Co., 2 Utah
174.
Silver City ~fin. Co. v. Lowry, 19 Utah
334; 57 P. 11.
Scott v. Crouch, 24 Utah 377; 67 P. 1068.
He1~trom v. R.odes, 30 Utah 122; 83 P. 730.
In this case, the theory of the defendant, Regional
Agricultural Credit Corporation, is, that the plaintiff bought the tax title from Davis County at the
request and for the benefit of Alice Farnworth;
although he used his own money ,for that purpose.
We shall concede, f,or the purpose of this argument
that a plaintiff, including a c.ounter-complainant,
may seek to have a constructive trust established
in certain propertY, and. in the same action ask to
ha,re his title quieted. Upon proper pleading-s tnat
mnY hr ilonP.
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California Trust Co. v. Coihn, 114 Cal. App.
763; 299 P. 811.
Thompson v. Reynolds; 59 Ut. 416; 204 P.
576.
American Min. Co. v. Trash, 28 Idaho 642;
156 P. 1136.
By that we mean that if in an action to quiet title,
equitable relief is asked for, sufficient grounds
therefor must be pleaded. It was so held in
Glasmann v. O'Donnell, 6 Ut. 446; 24 P.
537,
and numerous Utah and other cases, which we shall
hereinafter mention.
It is elementary, that one of the necessary elements
to sustain an action to quiet title is, that plaintiff
must be the owner, either legal or equitable, of the
title s·ought to be quieted (51 C. tT. 247, Sec. 224),
and it has been often held, as in
State v. Rolio, 71 Ut. 91; 262 P. 987,
that ''in an action to quiet title, the plaintiff may
allege his title, ownership, and possession in general terms, and thereunder p.rove whatever title he
has.'' But the procedure of the defendant Regional
Agricultural Credit Corporation is not so simple.
It is in the position of a plaintiff who is seeking to
have a trust established, and, in the same action
a.sking to have his title quieted. The ordinary procedure in establishing a constructive trust .is that
pursued in
Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Ut. 48; 95 P. 527,
.
in which the plaintiff pleaded the defendant's verbal promise to purchase plaintift's property at
foreclosure sale and convey it to heT, and also the
fraud characterizing the promise. And in a case
like that h~fore the Court,' the principal relief
sought is the estahishment of a constructive trust,
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and the prayer to quiet title is nterely incidental to
that principal relief.
It is the law of this State, and, we presun1e, in most
of the States, that if the plaintiff, in an action to
quiet title, alleg-es title or ownership in general
terms, the defendant 1nay, under a general denial,
p1~ove 'fraud; but that does not mean that he may
prove a constructive trust, and the fraud essential
to its establishment} without specially pleading the
fraud. This is illustrated by the case of
Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho
472: 262 p. 1052.

In that case, a mortgage had been foreclosed against
plaintiffs, and, as they alleged, they failed to redeem within the statutory time, because they were
misled by the agreement or voluntary assurance of
the purchaser that they should have additional time
'
to redeem. The Court, citing
Security State Bank v. Kramer, 50 N. D.
20; 198 N. W. 79,
(to which the cases therein cited, we invite the
Court's especial attention) compared the case to
one of trust and fraud, in which: the remedy is exclusively in equity. The plaintiff, had however,
brought an ordinary action to quiet title, alleging
ownership in general terms ; and regarding this
the Court says:
"Appellants (plaintiffs) have wholly failed
to ask the trial eourt for an award permitting them to redeem, nor have they pleaded
any facts on which they could predicafe
such a request. Not until a court of equity,
upon a proper bill, shall have awarded the
right to redeem and the redemption has
been effected, ran appellant have any title
to f!Hiet."
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The Court said that the rule which, in quiet,ing title
cases, permits instr-uments to be attacked fo~ fraud,
?S confined to cases of fr.aud in the executwn,. delivery, etc., of instruments. The Utah cases are to
the same effect; and so in
Silver City Min. Co. v. Lowry, 19 Ut. 335;
57 P. 11, an action to quiet title, the
Court said:
''If true, the respondent (plaintiff) is mis,..
taken in the remedy which would be to bring
an action in equity to compel the owners of
the Clarissato deed it to the respondent on
the ground that the appellants were trustees of the respondent.''
In Kahn v. Old Telegraph :Min. Co., 2 Ut.
174, 195, it was said:
"\Vhile it is conceded that, under the system of code pleading, an equitable defense
may be set up in an action of ejectment, it
is also well settled that such defense must
contain all the essentials of a bill in equity,
:1nd the issue thus made is triable by the
court without a jury, as an equitable issue.''
And the Court held (see 19th paragraph of syllahus), that ''In an action of ejectment, the question is
as to who has the better title; therefore.
before the defendant e.an prevail on an inferior or equitable title, he must first, in
equity, subject the better title to him. He
must become an actor and invoke equitable
::1ffirmative relief.''
If the le,ga.I title to the property involved stands in
)np party, and the othPr rlaims a constructive trust,
the burden is upon the lath~r to show that the holder
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of the legal title is not entitled to retain it, but
holds it in trust for hin1.
Scott v. Crouch, :24 Ut. :377; 67 P. 1068.
And as the defendant, Regional ..:\grienltural Credit
Corporation, claims that the plaintiff boug-ht the
county's tax title for Alice Farnworth, it should
have alleg·ed and pro,·ed facts showing that the pur_.
chase was false and fraudulent. This, that defendant has failed to do.
In 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.),
in discussing this section it is said that, under the
circumstances mentioned by him, ~quity impresses
a trust even ''in favor of one who is truly and equitably ·entitled to the same, although he n1ay never
perhaps have had any legal estate therein,'' and we
shall not deny that if there had been a transaction
between the plaintiff and Alice Farnworth, which
was pretended and collusive, and under which ::1\ttrs.
F1arnworth remained the beneficial owner, the
rlefendant, Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation might ask for a judicial declaration of a trust
in her favor and that that defendant's judgment
continued as a lien thereon. But we do not believe
that the named defendant could, any more than a
stranger, enforce as a constructive or other tru;:t,
the voluntary a!,rreement of the plaintiff. if any suPh
agreement were made, to purchase the tax title to
Mrs. Farnworth's property and convey the same
to her. The evidence does not show such an agreement, but if it did, it wo•uld not he a sufficient basis
of a constructive or other trust, nor does the evidence show the fraud which must characterize the
agreement. ''The fraud,'' it was said in
Beebe v. BPPhc, 252 N. Y. S. 310,
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must be something more than a mere breach of an
agreement." In
Funk v. Engel, 235 Niich. 195; 209 N. W.
160,
it was said that, "Defendant's breach of his promise to do certain acts in the future is not, standing
nlone, fraud.'' And in
X eagle v. McMullan, 334 Ill. 163; 165 N. E.
605,
1t was held, that "mere breach of grantee's oral
promise to hold property conveyed for another
does not constitute sueh fraud as to take the case
out of the statut~ of frauds."
'rhe respondent also cited
IYrs v. Granger, 42 Utah 608; 134 · P. 169.
Deseret Irr. Co. v. Bishop, 92 Utah 220;
67 P. 210.
In all of the cases we have cited, the plaintiff or
counter-complainant S'Oru.ght to establish a constructive trust; and the rule ordinarily applied to such
cases is stated, in
Jos,eph v. Evans, 338 Ill. 11; 170 N. E. 10,
to be that ''an oral agreement for the conveyance
of real estate to be enforceable must be clear and
definite in the terms, free from doubt and suspicion
and for a valuable consideration.'~ In
Helstrom v. Rodes, 30 Ut. 122; 83 P. 730,
.Justice Straup referred to the insufficiency of the
complaint and findings relating to a trus,t, as follows:
"It is not alleg~d in the answer nor found
hy the court, that in locating the claim or
obtaining the patent, plaintiff or the owners of the Lily Lode were guiltv of any
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

fraud or wrong, or that any act or thing
was done by the1n to defeat any right of
the defendant or his grantee, nor does the
evidence sho\Y any such facts.''
Counsel in their brief have picked out isolated parts
cf the ·testimony which, standing alone, m.ight justify an inference that Jlr. Free intended to permit
the Farnworths or Mr. Skeen to buy this property
back from him. He states he was not interested in
owning a farm and did not want a farm but had a
moral interest in the Farnworths. There is no testimony that he ecer talked with Mrs. Farnworth
about buying this property. He did talk with Mr.
Farnworth, Jr., whom the record shows had no interest in the property at all. He looked to -Mr.
Skeen for an assurance that the title would be clear
or he would have a first lien on the property for
his money. No note was taken; no ag'reement made,
011al or written, which placed Free under any obligation to Mrs. Farnworth. Later, beca;use of the
'mortgage, Mr. Skeen had against the property, Mr.
Free gave Mr. Skeen an option to buy the property.
For the option :Mr. Skeen agreed to clear the title
and, upon exercise of the option, to pay the money
advanced, with interest, and all expenses incurred
by Mr. Free. Such an option was perfectly legal
.and proper, and we repeat neither Mr. Skeen nor
~vfr. Free thereby incurred any obligation to the
Farnworths or anyone else interested in the
property.
None of the partieR intere8tNl saw fit to exercise
the right given to them to huv the property, so why
should they now complain?. We snhmit that an examination of the evidence on this nhase clearly
PstahlisheR a valid tax sale. and no relation, agree-
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ment or obligation of the plaintiff Free, indicated.
by the evidence or the law, could prevent him from
being a bona fide legal purchaser of this property
from the county at tax sale with the right to hold,
,:resell or handle the property as he might see fit.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court should he in all respects affirmed
with costs to the respondent.

ROBERT L. CRAN1IER
AND CHRIS 1\iATHISON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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